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TEXAS GULF SULPHUR AND THE GENESIS
OF CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER
RULE 10b-5
A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson*
ABSTRACT
This Essay explores the seminal role played by SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. in establishing Rule 10b-5’s use to create a remedy against
corporations for misstatements made by their officers. The question of the
corporation’s liability for private damages loomed large for the Second
Circuit judges in Texas Gulf Sulphur, even though that question was not
directly at issue in an SEC action for injunctive relief. The judges considered both, construing narrowly “in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security,” and the requisite state of mind required for violating Rule
10b-5. We explore the choices of the Second Circuit judges by analyzing
not only material available in the published opinions, but also the internal
memos that the judges circulated among themselves prior to issuing the
decision. Ultimately, the Second Circuit majority construed “in connection
with” broadly, a choice ultimately validated by the Supreme Court. The
Second Circuit’s choice of negligence for SEC injunctive actions, however,
was rejected by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases for both private
plaintiffs and the SEC.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR MATERIAL
MISSTATEMENTS AND POSSIBLE LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . .
A. IN CONNECTION WITH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. STATE OF MIND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE AFTERMATH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. BANKERS LIFE: WIDENING THE REACH OF “IN
CONNECTION WITH” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. STATE OF MIND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

930
932
936
939
939
942
946

* Frances & George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan, and Peter P.
Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University, respectively. Pritchard acknowledges the generous financial support of the William W. Cook Endowment of
the University of Michigan.

927

928

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

S

CHOLARS have long recognized the seminal role played by SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.1 in transforming insider trading law.2
Less recognized is the opinion’s foundational role in Rule 10b-5’s
use to create a remedy against corporations for misstatements made by
their officers (or others) even if the speaker had no evil motive and the
company itself did not trade. That less-discussed part of the case is our
topic here, for it was an important early step in the growth of two key
securities issues that took root during the 1960s—the judicial implication
of private rights of action under Rule 10b-5 and the expansion of obligations of corporate directors under “federal corporation law.”3 Today, the
issue of corporate liability lies at the heart of the ongoing debate over the
social purpose and utility of securities fraud class actions. This essay takes
that question back to its historical roots in the 1960s as the use of Rule
10b-5 was accelerating, focusing on the debate in Texas Gulf Sulphur
among the judges of the Second Circuit, the “Mother Court” for securities law.4
Like its holding on insider trading, the Second Circuit’s holding on corporate liability decided an issue that the Supreme Court had not yet come
close to tackling.5 Each of the Texas Gulf Sulphur holdings, however,
drew on the foundation provided by the expansive statutory interpretation used by the Supreme Court in two securities cases decided earlier in
the decade: SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc. and J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak.6 Capital Gains endorsed a mode of statutory interpretation that
focused on implementing the purpose underlying the securities laws,7
while J.I Case blessed the creation of novel causes of action by the judiciary to implement those purposes.8 The Second Circuit tackled the task of
defining the elements of these newfound federal causes of action against
the background of the common law. That embroiled the Second Circuit
judges in a broader jurisprudential debate on the relative weight that
should be afforded to text and purpose in statutory interpretation.
The question of the corporation’s liability for private damages loomed
large for the Second Circuit judges in Texas Gulf Sulphur, even though
the question was not directly at issue in the SEC action for injunctive
1. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2. We have tackled that subject from a historical perspective in related work that
focuses on how insider trading regulation shifted during the 1960s from a mechanistic approach under § 16(b) to a broad, antifraud based remedy under Rule 10b-5. A.C. Pritchard
& Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties: The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the Triumph of Purpose Over Text, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
3. See id. (developing insider trading, private rights of action, and federal corporation
law as the three pillars of securities law that arose during the 1960s).
4. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
5. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 859–62.
6. See generally SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
7. See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191–95, 200–01.
8. See J.I. Case, 377 U.S. at 433.
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relief. The judges recognized that the private damages issue under Rule
10b-5 was the 800-pound gorilla; a majority of the court’s nine judges
were inclined to find a way to limit the corporation’s liability in the absence of wrongful intent. Two paths toward the goal of limiting corporate
liability presented themselves. The first was based on the text of Rule
10b-5,9 along with the statutory provision that authorizes it, § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).10 The textual possibility was for the court to construe narrowly “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security,” a requirement of both the rule and the
statute.11 The alternative doctrinal direction that the Second Circuit
could have pursued to narrow Texas Gulf Sulphur’s potential liability
borrowed from the common law of fraud: what was the requisite state of
mind for the corporation making the misstatement?
In the end, the Second Circuit majority in Texas Gulf Sulphur gave an
expansive interpretation to each of these requirements, a surprising result
given the tone of their discussions and the concerns raised about private
causes of action.12 The simple explanation was the court’s prudential retreat to address only the SEC’s pursuit of an injunction. Such a resolution
left for another day the looming damages issues arising from private
actions.13
The court’s holdings on both “in connection with” and state of mind
shaped subsequent Supreme Court developments, but in divergent ways.
The “in connection with” requirement, which reached the Supreme Court
fairly quickly, produced a consistent, and indeed, even more expansive
holding. In the following decade, however, the Court, with new personnel
more committed to text than purpose, would reject negligence in favor of
a more restrictive state of mind standard.
We focus here on the role that text and purpose played in Texas Gulf
Sulphur in delineating limits for corporate liability under Rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act. We shed light on that debate over corporate liability
by analyzing not only material available in the published opinions, but
also the internal memos that the judges circulated among themselves
prior to issuing the decision.14 In Part I, we take a deep dive into the
deliberations among the Second Circuit judges on the question of corporate liability for material misstatements in Texas Gulf Sulphur. In Part II,
we look at that decision’s long-term implications for securities law, followed by a brief conclusion.

9. See Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R 240.10b-5 (2017).
10. See Exchange Act § 78j(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
11. 17 C.F.R 240.10b-5; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
12. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859–62 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
13. See id. at 863. See the discussion at note 59 and accompanying text.
14. We obtained copies of the memos from the Henry Friendly Collection at the
Harvard Law School Library [hereinafter Friendly Collection].
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I. CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR MATERIAL
MISSTATEMENTS AND POSSIBLE LIMITS
The SEC complaint in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation presented two
central claims. The first count was against various individuals who had
purchased company stock while having confidential inside information
regarding an exceptionally rich ore find by the company. The second
count was against the corporation alleged misleading statements in company press releases, issued to dampen rumors of that potentially enormous mineral find. The statements, viewed with the benefit of hindsight,
understated the find in material ways. Even so, the press release did not
seem motivated by a malevolent purpose. As Judge Henry Friendly put it
in his concurring opinion,
No one has asserted, or reasonably could assert, that the purpose for
issuing a release was anything but good. TGS felt it had a responsibility to protect would-b[e] buyers of its shares from what it regarded
as exaggerated rumors first in the Canadian and then in the New
York City press, and none of the individual defendants sought to
profit from the decline in the price of TGS stock caused by the
release.15
The press release showed poor judgment, not ill intent.
Although this case involved the SEC as a plaintiff seeking an injunction, Friendly was worried from the beginning about the difficulty of distinguishing government claims from private claims.16 He was wary of
creating a potentially enormous new source of liability for corporations, a
liability that would ultimately be borne by shareholders. After the case
was submitted to the en banc panel, Friendly wrote Harvard securities
law professor Louis Loss, whom he knew from the initial meetings leading to the American Law Institute’s project to draft a comprehensive Federal Securities Code, on which Friendly served as an adviser. The Judge
requested the relevant pages from Loss’s forthcoming revision of his treatise “dealing with the remedial aspects of Rule 10b-5 as applied to private
litigation, since I do not think we could deal intelligently with the instant
case without considering its effect in that field.”17 Judge Friendly had already circulated a memo to his colleagues declaring that the corporation’s
liability for its press release was
the most important issue in the case. If there were any way to limit
the holding to injunctive relief or even to actions brought by the
SEC, the dangers inherent in the opinion of the panel majority
would not be anything like so great . . . the financial consequences of
15. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 866 (Friendly, J., concurring).
16. The district court in Texas Gulf Sulphur had noted that forty-nine private actions
under Rule 10b-5 were pending. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 267 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). A private suit
based on the same facts eventually reached the Tenth Circuit. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir. 1971).
17. Letter from Judge Henry J. Friendly to Louis Loss, Professor, Harvard Law Sch.
(May 27, 1968) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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holding corporation liable for innocent errors or omissions in press
releases, all judged on a basis of hindsight, are incalculable. We kid
ourselves when we talk of liability of ‘the corporation’; the rule announced by the majority would cause thousands of innocent investors like ourselves, who buy stocks and put them away, to be mulcted
for the benefit of tapewatchers and more particularly, of Pomerantz
& Co.18
The question of insider trading on the potential mineral find was the
headline grabber, but Friendly recognized the substantially greater economic significance of the corporate liability issue.19
The memos among the judges reveal that most of Friendly’s colleagues
shared his concern about corporations’ liability for damages. As we discuss below, Kaufman and Anderson responded with sympathetic memos
and joined in all or in part of Friendly’s concurrence in the published
decision making this point.20 Feinberg’s memo expressed similar worry,
although he did not end up joining in Friendly’s concurrence.21 The two
dissenters to the decision, Moore and Lumbard, favored narrowing the
corporation’s liability.22
As the debate unfolded in response to Friendly’s memo, the judges
considered two ways to rein in the possibility of large corporate damages
for misstatements: (1) reading the “in connection with a purchase or sale”
requirement narrowly when the alleged wrongdoer had neither purchased nor sold; or (2) requiring scienter, the mental state required for an
actor to be held liable for damages for fraud, on the part of the corporation. In the end, the judges in the majority limited their holding to injunction claims brought by the SEC, which was, after all, the issue before
them.23 In that context, the majority provided an expansive reading of
Rule 10b-5 which rested on its understanding of the purpose of the Exchange Act.24
18. Memorandum from Judge Henry J. Friendly on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
(May 8, 1968) [hereinafter Memo from HJF] (on file with SMU Law Review). Pomerantz
is the name of a leading plaintiff’s side firm of the era, one that is still active today. See
Firm History, POMERANTZ LLP, http://pomerantzlawfirm.com/firm-history-1/ [https://
perma.cc/7WWN-RA82] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
19. See Memo from HJF, supra note 18.
20. See Memorandum from Irving R. Kaufman on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
(May 14, 1968) [hereinafter Memo from IRK] (on file with SMU Law Review).
21. See Memorandum from Wilfred Feinberg on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (May
28, 1968) [hereinafter Memo from WF] (on file with SMU Law Review).
22. Judge Friendly, in a memorandum to his judicial colleagues on the Gerstle case,
characterized his concurring opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur on this point as one that “commanded a majority of the court that something more than mere negligence was needed to
create liability for money damages.” Memorandum from Judge Henry J. Friendly on Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo 4 (Feb. 20, 1973) (on file with SMU Law Review). See also David S.
Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur—The Second Round: Privity and the State of Mind in Rule 10b5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 447 (1968) (concluding from the same
facts that “it may be that no majority can be mustered in the Second Circuit to impose
liability for negligent mis[representations] in non-privity cases.”).
23. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
24. See id.
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A. IN CONNECTION WITH
How broadly does the phrase “in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security” sweep? It surely encompasses individuals and entities
who make material misrepresentations while buying or selling securities.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, was doing neither at the time it issued its
ill-advised press release. If the company had been buying back shares at
the time of its pessimistic press release (or, more commonly, selling
shares while making unduly optimistic statements), liability would have
been straightforward, even under the common law of deceit. Indeed, a
CEO purchasing shares while badmouthing the company’s prospects was
the impetus for the SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b-5 in 1942.25 But should
liability extend to a corporation that was neither buying nor selling its
own securities? The text offers little guidance, although the choice of “in
connection with” rather than “in” suggests that Congress intended something broader than just privity. How close does the requisite “connection”
to a securities transaction need to be?
The district court concluded that the corporation’s benign intentions—
and the fact that it was not trading in its own securities—defeated the
element that its misrepresentations be “in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.”26 The court held that “the issuance of a false and
misleading press release may constitute a violation of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 if its purpose is to affect the market price of [the] company’s stock
to the advantage of the company or its insiders.”27 The district court’s
standard is reminiscent of the situation that gave rise to Rule 10b-5’s
adoption; the only twist in the standard is extending liability to the corporation as well as the officer who was manipulating the share price for his
own benefit. But both circumstances were absent on the facts presented
in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
The Second Circuit majority rejected the narrow construction of “in
connection with” adopted by the district court, instead adopting a “reasonably calculated to influence the investing public” standard.28 The majority reasoned that “the court below used a standard that does not
reflect the congressional purpose that prompted the passage of the [Exchange Act].”29 Purpose, not text, was the relevant standard, according to
25. See Milton Freeman, Comment, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (comment by Milton Freeman, Attorney and Assistant Solicitor, SEC, 1934–46).
26. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. Id. at 293 (citing Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,317
(N.D. Ill. 1964)).
28. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 862 (“[W]e hold that Rule 10b-5 is violated
whenever assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public, e.g., by means of the financial media, if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.”) (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 858.
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the majority, rolling out a quote from Judge Learned Hand in support of
that position:
[T]he purpose of a statutory provision is the best test of the meanings of the words chosen. We are to put ourselves so far as we can in
the position of the legislature that uttered them, and decide whether
or not it would declare that the situation that has arisen is within
what it wishes to cover. Indeed, at times the purpose may be so manifest as to override even the explicit words used.30
The purposes of the Exchange Act, according to the majority, “[was] to
promote . . . public securities markets and to protect the investing public
from suffering inequities in trading, including, specifically, inequities that
follow from trading that has been stimulated by the publication of false or
misleading corporate information releases.”31 This finding of Congress’s
purpose was supported by legislative history proclaiming the virtues of
corporate transparency.32
The majority took the additional step of citing other provisions of the
securities laws with narrower prerequisites as “demonstrat[ing] that when
Congress intended that there be a participation in a securities transaction
as a prerequisite of a violation, it knew how to make that intention
clear.”33 (Of course, those provisions explicitly created private causes of
action, in contrast to the judicially discovered cause of action under
§ 10(b).) In the absence of clear language limiting the scope of § 10(b),
the majority was willing to read the “in connection with” requirement as
broadly as its reading of legislative purpose. The “obvious purposes of the
Act to protect the investing public and to secure fair dealing in the securities markets would be seriously undermined” by a requirement that the
defendants “engage[ ] in related securities transactions or otherwise act[ ]
with wrongful motives.”34 Stated at that level of abstraction, statutory
purpose could be invoked to support virtually any measure against fraud.
There was no limiting principle.
The majority did offer an evidentiary justification for its broad construction, stating: “Absent a securities transaction by an insider it is almost impossible to prove that a wrongful purpose motivated the issuance
of the misleading statement.”35 Adding a requirement of wrongful purpose to the “in connection with” requirement would make the anti-fraud
prohibition underinclusive, in the majority’s view. The absence of a securities transaction “does not negate the possibility of wrongful purpose;
perhaps the market did not react to the misleading statement as much as
30. Id. at 861 (quoting Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959)).
31. Id. at 858.
32. See id. at 858–59 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) and S. REP. NO. 73792, at 18 (1934)).
33. Id. at 860 (citing Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (2012); Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15,
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (2012)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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was anticipated or perhaps the wrongful purpose was something other
than the desire to buy at a low price or sell at a high price.”36 The first
possibility seems somewhat fanciful—an attempt at fraud that fell short
of the mark. The latter suggestion is at least speculative. More candidly,
the court argued “that the investing public may be injured as much by
one’s misleading statement containing inaccuracies caused by negligence
as by a misleading statement published intentionally to further a wrongful
purpose.”37 Once again, the majority fell back on what it viewed as the
purpose of the statute—the protection of investors. The statutory text
was, at most, a secondary consideration.
The majority’s broad conclusion with respect to the “in connection
with” argument got little pushback from the other judges on the Second
Circuit. Only two judges of the en banc court (the predictably conservative Moore and Lumbard) agreed with the district court’s holding requiring a wrongful purpose.38 Moore argued that the majority’s interpretation
“indicates that Congress intended a revolutionary change in the whole
thrust of the securities laws. That is too slim a basis to support a judicial
excursion over such uncharted seas.”39 Moore’s characterization of the
majority’s holding effecting a “revolutionary change” in securities regulation certainly proved prescient, but it garnered little traction with his fellow judges.
Even the judges who were wary of expanding corporate liability were
unwilling to sign on to the restrictive interpretation of “in connection
with.” Friendly, for example, was alarmed by the specter of corporate
liability raised by the majority’s holding.
It is inconceivable that Congress meant that the SEC’s rule-making
power under § 10(b) should enable it to impose on press releases and
other company statements not made in the sale of a security a liability broader and unaccompanied by the procedural safeguards of § 12
of the Securities Act or § 18 of the Exchange Act. Yet the combination of the majority’s broad reading of ‘In connection with’ and its
holding that Rule 10-b-5 encompasses negligent misrepresentation
produces exactly that result. The consequences would be most serious. Either innocent stockholders will be damaged, as I have indicated, or companies will clam up.40
Friendly at “first thought that the way of out of this dilemma was to agree
with [Moore’s] limited reading of ‘in connection with.’”41 But he was dissuaded by issues raised in a case argued the same week as Texas Gulf
Sulphur (i.e., Great American)42 as well as Louis Loss’s position on the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 869, 881–89 (Moore, J., dissenting, joined by Lumbard, J.).
Id. at 885.
See Memo from HJF, supra note 18.
Id.
See generally SEC v. Great American Indus., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968).
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issue.43
In his memo in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, Judge Irving Kaufman
urged that “The 1934 Act and the rules adopted pursuant thereto contain
broad remedial provisions that should be liberally construed; I fear that
[Moore]’s limited reading would effectively insulate many predatory
practices from commission purview.”44 A new theme emerges here: judicial support for limiting private lawsuits, but not if the limitation also constrained the SEC’s authority.45 This differential private/public treatment
would be a recurring issue in the Supreme Court’s securities jurisprudence in subsequent years.46
Judge Wilfred Feinberg, like Friendly, viewed the press release as “the
most important issue in the case.”47 Notwithstanding his concerns over
corporate liability, Feinberg’s take on the “in connection with” issue is
typical of his colleagues in Texas Gulf Sulphur:
[I]mposing civil liability on the corporation because of this and no
more, as [Henry Friendly] and [Irving Kaufman] have pointed out,
could have disastrous results. In addition to inhibiting the flow of
corporate information, private damage suits could bankrupt corporations, with the big losers including the very shareholders the rule is
supposed to protect. Therefore, it does seem necessary to limit potential liability in a conceptually defensible way. However, narrowing the definition of “in connection with” is not wise. It will insulate
intentionally misleading statements which are intended to affect
stock prices; such deception should be covered by Rule 10b-5. The
remedial intent of Congress can be better served by continuing to
interpret “in connection with” broadly, but limiting the application
of the Rule by other means.48
The “in connection with” requirement offered a textual basis for limiting
corporate liability, but the language chosen by Congress hardly compelled a restrictive reading. More relevant for an intermediate appellate
court, a narrow construction of the language would seem to fly in the face
43. See Memo from HJF, supra note 18. Loss’s position further states: “If this would
be the last case to raise the issue [of “in connection with”], I would [agree with Moore].
But it won’t be, as witness Great American. True we could distinguish that case on the basis
that GAI was constantly issuing stock, but this seems unsatisfactory and Professor Loss,
who objects to an unlimited expansion of Rule 10-b-5, thinks the rule may well be applied
‘when a company publishes a prospectus or financial statement with the clear intention of
conducting open-market purchases.’” Id. (citation omitted).
44. Memo from IRK, supra note 20.
45. See Memo from WF, supra note 21 (“The justification for making . . . a distinction
[between injunctive relief and damages] here is even stronger, where the plaintiff is the
Commission representing the public.”) (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 193 (1963) for the proposition that “[i]t is not necessary in a suit for equitable or
prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages.”).
46. See infra notes 66–83.
47. Memo from WF, supra note 21.
48. Id.; see also Memorandum from Judge John J. Smith on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. (June 3, 1968) [hereinafter Memo from JJS] (on file with SMU Law Review) (Press
release “was ‘in connection with’ purchase and sale of securities because of its intended
and inevitable market effect.”).
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of the Supreme Court’s instruction in Capital Gains that “securities legislation ‘enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds’” was to be construed
“not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.”49 That instruction from above—issued in a case reversing a
narrow reading of the securities laws by the Second Circuit—lurked in
the background in Texas Gulf Sulphur, as it did in other expansive Second Circuit securities cases in the 1960s.
B. STATE

OF

MIND

Judge Friendly pointed the way toward a means other than “in connection with” to limit the reach of Rule 10b-5. In Friendly’s memo on the
Great American case, written just a day after his Texas Gulf Sulphur
memo, he commented “Once we decide that ‘in connection with’ is not a
useful method for bringing some limits on Rule 10-b-5 but that the way to
do this is to impose some kind of guilty action requirement, this case is
not a hard one.”50 Here, Judge Friendly sees what would become the preferred method to limit Rule 10b-5 by both the Supreme Court (in Ernst &
Ernst, discussed below)51 and Congress (in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).52
The issue of the requisite state of mind for a violation of Rule 10b-5
was still very much in play circa 1968. Neither Rule 10b-5, nor its underlying statute, § 10(b), explicitly set forth a required state of mind for violations. The possibilities ranged from strict liability, to negligence, to
recklessness, to knowledge, or specific intent to harm. The common law
of fraud rejected strict liability, perhaps included negligence as a species
of equitable fraud, and generally accepted the last three possibilities in
suits for damages. The question of state of mind was further complicated
by the fact that corporations do not have minds: they are fictional legal
entities. So, whose intentions would count?
The majority’s arguments relating to “in connection with” overlap with
its arguments relating to state of mind.53 The Second Circuit strongly
sided with the SEC, rejecting the effort to “handicap unreasonably the
Commission in its work.”54 The court cited Capital Gains for the proposition that “[i]n an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic
49. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (citations and quotations omitted).
50. Memorandum from Judge Henry J. Friendly on SEC v. Great American Indus.
(May 9, 1968) (on file with SMU Law Review).
51. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198 (1976).
52. See generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995).
53. Taken to its logical conclusion, the majority’s argument for rejecting wrongful purpose would require a strict liability standard, an argument that Justice Powell would gently
mock the SEC for making in support of a negligence standard in Ernst & Ernst. See 425
U.S. at 198 (“The logic of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for wholly
faultless conduct where such conduct results in harm to investors, a result the Commission
would be unlikely to support.”).
54. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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relief, the common law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified
in the interests of broader protection for the investing public so that negligent insider conduct has become unlawful.”55 The majority opted for the
negligence standard, as “comport[ing] with the administrative and . . .
legislative purposes underlying the Rule” that would “promote[ ] the deterrence objective of the Rule.”56 The only concession to concerns about
corporate liability was to limit the negligence holding to injunctive actions brought by the SEC.57 Even there, however, the majority placed the
burden on the defendant to establish its due diligence.58 Private suits for
damages would wait for another day.59
The reservation of that question did not placate Judge Friendly. In his
initial memo on the case, he argued for the fraudulent intent requirement
from the common law, invoking the authority of Jerome Frank, the SEC
Chair prior to his appointment to the Second Circuit, stating:
The . . . more satisfactory[ ] escape is by holding that § 10(b) is limited to cases where there is some kind of an evil motive, as said by
Judge Frank in Fischman v. Raytheon Mf. Co. 188 F.2d 783, 786 2
Cir. 1951) – which I take to be required also under § 17 of the 1933
Act. At the very least § 10-b doesn’t authorize imposition for negligent execution in the course of pursuing a good motive. Certainly
this would seem the appropriate view for private suits. One might
argue that as a policy matter, a different view should prevail for injunction suits by the SEC. However, I see no basis in the statute for
making that distinction and the SEC’s power to stop trading will usually suffice to enable it to bring the company to terms.60
In his published concurrence, Judge Friendly blurred the difference between scienter for injunctions and private actions for damages. Repeating
his concerns about the frightening consequences for corporate liability in
press release contexts such as this, Friendly—somewhat obtusely—left
some room for injunctions on a lower standard: “I . . . am not disposed to
hold that Congress meant to deny a power whose use in appropriate cases
can be of such great public benefit and do so little harm to legitimate
activity.”61 But, he paired this broader space for injunctions with a strong
suggestion to the trial judge on remand that an injunction in a case such
55. Id. at 854–55.
56. Id. at 855.
57. See id. at 863.
58. See id. at 862 (“[I]f corporate management demonstrates that it was diligent in
ascertaining that the information it published was the whole truth and that such diligently
obtained information was disseminated in good faith, Rule 10b-5 would not have been
violated.”).
59. See id. at 863 (“The only remedy the Commissions seeks against the corporation is
an injunction . . . and therefore we do not find it necessary to decide whether just a lack of
due diligence on the part of [Texas Gulf Sulphur], absent a showing of bad faith, would
subject the corporation to any liability for damages.”).
60. Memo from HJF, supra note 18.
61. Id.
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as this would not be appropriate.62 Friendly’s initial difficulty in drawing a
line between private suits and SEC suits with respect to state of mind
would prove dispositive when the issue eventually reached the Supreme
Court, as we discuss below.63 For the time being, however, all options
were available to the judges of the Second Circuit.
Other judges shared Friendly’s concern about the negligence standard,
but there was no consensus among them on the correct standard. Judge
Kaufman responded to Friendly’s memo:
While I am attracted to HJF’s proposal of limiting §10(b) to cases
where there is some kind of evil motive, or, in Loss’ terms, p. 1766,
imposing a watered-down scienter requirement, it seems to me that
such an explicit formulation goes against the thrust of S.E.C. v. Capitol [sic] Gains . . . Also, I see no reason why §10(b) should not apply
to a release issued with the best of motives that was truly distorted or
prepared in a careless or wreckless [sic] manner.64
Capital Gains, which had offered strong support to the majority’s broad
insider trading holding, again loomed, this time as an obstacle to efforts
to restrain corporate liability under Rule 10b-5. Judge Robert Anderson
worried about the ability of courts to manage a disclosure regime so ambitious: “Aside from the dubious nature of the proposition that §10(b)
was intended to cover the field of corporate reporting, absent some more
explicit guidance from Congress, the courts seem exceedingly illequipped to handle this new general supervisory task.”65 He favored a
recklessness standard set at a very high level, stating:
A corporation should be held under 10b-5 for the consequences of a
materially misleading press release only where the corporation’s behavior in issuing the release is in some sense fraudulent or so reckless that evil intent would be presumed. While this would exclude
negligence, it would cover reckless disregard for the accuracy of releases and for their effect on the market as well as cases of purposeful misrepresentation made in pursuit of an ulterior motive.66
62. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 869 (“Here there is no danger of repetition . . .
a once-in-a-lifetime affair . . . I am content to leave it [to the trial judge] to consider
whether, although he has the power to issue an injunction, there is equity in this portion of
the bill.”).
63. When the question of state of mind arose under Rule 14a-9, however, Friendly and
the Second Circuit came down on the side of negligence. See Gerstle v. Gamble Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298 (2d Cir. 1973). Friendly leaned heavily on the textual differences
between § 10(b) and § 14(a), emphasizing the broader rulemaking authority afforded to
the SEC by the latter. See id. at 1299. Friendly also looked to the structure of the Exchange
Act:
[W]hile an open-ended reading of Rule 10b-5 would render the express civil
liability provisions of the securities acts largely superfluous, and be inconsistent with the limitations Congress built into these sections, a reading of Rule
14a-9 as imposing liability without scienter in a case like the present is completely compatible with the statutory scheme.
Id.
64. Memo from IRK, supra note 20.
65. Memorandum from Judge Robert P. Anderson on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
(May 27, 1968) [hereinafter Memo from RPA] (on file with SMU Law Review).
66. Id.
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Kaufman and Anderson eventually coalesced around a concurrence written by Friendly.67 The suggestion of a fourth member of the court with
similar views (i.e., Wilfred Feinberg) that “the opinion should indicate
our receptivity to some limiting doctrine in the private suit without spelling it out now” proved difficult to craft, and Feinberg signed on to the
majority opinion.68
II. THE AFTERMATH
Texas Gulf Sulphur laid down a marker in 10b-5 jurisprudence, but it
was hardly the last word. The “in connection with” element was the first
issue from Texas Gulf Sulphur to reach the Supreme Court, just three
years later. In 1971, purpose was still the coin of the realm in statutory
interpretation of the securities laws. Justice William O. Douglas’s opinion
for the court in Bankers Life gave an even broader application to the
phrase than Texas Gulf Sulphur had.69 Thereafter, the requirement receded in securities cases; the cases that did arise on this question, perhaps
because the doctrine had been pushed to the edges of factual connection,
led toward narrowing interpretations by both the Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit. In contrast, scienter, which would not reach the Supreme
Court until almost a decade later, became the key element policing the
scope of corporate liability under Rule 10b-5.
A. BANKERS LIFE: WIDENING THE REACH
WITH”

OF

“IN CONNECTION

The facts of Bankers Life, a case that came to the Second Circuit and
then to the Supreme Court in 1971, suggested egregious misconduct by
those in control of the corporation.70 Moreover, there were clearly substantial losses to the shareholders.71 The connection between the securities transaction and the misconduct, however, was attenuated. The
proceeds from an insurance company’s sale of securities (bonds) in a market transaction at a fair price were then shuffled around by insiders with
doubtful motives.72 The end result was that those proceeds were used to
pay for the controlling shares.73 That is to say, the corporation’s assets
had been removed from the corporate treasury to pay the purchase price
for the control block with no offsetting payment to the corporation. The
panel decision, written by District Judge M. Joseph Blumenfeld, sitting by
designation and joined by Judge Lumbard, found no Rule 10b-5 cause of
67. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 864–69 (Friendly, J., concurring, joined in part
by Kaufman, J., and Anderson, J.).
68. See Memo from WF, supra note 21.
69. See generally Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co.,
430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. See id. at 356–58.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 358.
73. See id.
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action.74 The connection between the wrongdoing and the securities
transaction was too remote. The facts looked like looting, not
manipulation.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The decision, written for the
Court by William O. Douglas, was handed down within three weeks of
argument.75 The opinion was vintage Douglas, relying strongly on the
purpose of the securities laws. The fraud smacked of mismanagement, as
it was perpetrated by officers of the insurance company and their outside
collaborators. Douglas found that fact “irrelevant” given the loss inflicted
on the company was a result of the wrongful conduct.76 Also of no moment was the absence of fraud in the securities transaction itself. All that
was necessary was that the injury to the company was “a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities.”77 The driving force behind
the capacious “touching” standard was Douglas’s extremely broad view
of congressional purpose: “disregard of trust relationships by those whom
the law should regard as fiduciaries[ ] are all a single seamless web along
with manipulation, investor[ ] ignorance, and the like.”78
Bankers Life was the last hurrah of broad securities interpretations
before the arrival of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist at the turn of
the year. Douglas’s reasoning comes straight out of Capital Gains:
“§ 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”79 Douglas does not, however, cite Capital Gains for that rule of interpretation.80
Nor did he cite the Second Circuit’s classic case, Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel, limiting the reach of Rule 10b-5 as applied to corporate mismanagement.81 Douglas did, however, cherry-pick Birnbaum’s holding, embracing its requirement that there be a purchase or sale of a security in a suit
by a private plaintiff.82
The effects of Douglas’s virtual evisceration of the “in connection
with” requirement would surface a generation later in cases in which the
language might have been a natural tool to confine corporate liability. In
Stoneridge, for example, plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that a massive accounting fraud by a television cable company (Charter) inflated the company’s reported operating revenues and cash flow.83 The twist was that
plaintiffs also named as defendants two equipment suppliers to Charter,
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.84 The plaintiffs alleged that Charter
74. Id. at 360–61.
75. See generally Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971).
76. See id. at 10.
77. Id. at 12–13.
78. Id. at 11 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 6 (1934)).
79. Id. at 12.
80. See id. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
81. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
82. See Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 9. In this case, the requisite transaction was the sale
of bonds by the corporation. See id.
83. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153
(2008).
84. Id. at 154.
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paid the suppliers $20 extra for each cable set-top box in return for the
supplier’s agreement to make additional payments back to Charter in the
form of advertising fees.85 The suppliers had no direct role in preparing
or disseminating the fraudulent accounting information, nor did they approve Charter’s financial statements.86 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing
for the Court, focused on the lack of reliance: Investors relied on Charter
for its financial statements, not the cable set-top box transactions underlying those financial statements.87 But, Kennedy’s principal concern was
the specter of the seemingly unlimited reach of Rule 10b-5 liability.88
Kennedy argued that the plaintiff’s theory threatened to inject the
§ 10(b) cause of action into “the realm of ordinary business operations.”89 According to Kennedy, “[w]ere this concept of reliance to be
adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole marketplace
in which the issuing company does business.”90 Kennedy pointed to
§ 10(b)’s limit that the deceptive act must “be in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”91 And the limits that he was drawing
around the concept of reliance could have more naturally been put into
the “in connection with” element.92
Why not use the “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” language to limit the scope of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action? Reminiscent of the attitude articulated by Judge Kaufman in Texas Gulf
Sulphur,93 the use of the “in connection with the purchase or sale” requirement would limit not only private plaintiffs, but potentially the SEC,
whose enforcement authority is limited by the reach of the statute. Kennedy acknowledged that the SEC’s enforcement authority might reach
commercial transactions like those between Charter and its suppliers, but
he was reluctant to afford the same freedom to the plaintiffs’ bar.94 Given
the need to cabin private rights of action but maintain the SEC’s discretion, the reliance requirement was a flexible tool. Reliance does not apply
in enforcement actions brought by the SEC or criminal prosecutions
85. Id.
86. Id. at 155.
87. See id. at 159.
88. See id. at 165.
89. Id. at 161.
90. Id. at 160.
91. Id.
92. This possible overlap of “in connection with” and other elements of a Rule 10b-5
action is potentially broader. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third Party Liability under Rule 10b-5, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2149–52 (2010) (noting “in connection with” over time had come to
be interpreted as a proximate cause requirement with the standard interpretation in terms
of foreseeability, not the speaker’s motivation; the Stoneridge court’s rejection of this argument—in the guise of reliance, restricted the standard proximate cause analysis, while leaving “in connection with” untouched, to the benefit of government plaintiffs).
93. See 401 F. 2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
94. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161 (“Were the implied cause of action to be extended to
the practices described here . . . there would be a risk that the federal power would be used
to invite litigation beyond the immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already
governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees.”).

942

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

brought by the Justice Department.95 Putting the limit on secondary party
liability in the reliance element, rather than “in connection with,” allowed
the Court to have its cake—i.e., unfettered government enforcement—
and eat it, too—i.e., constrain the scope of private actions. Stoneridge
shows that “in connection with” does none of the work in the Supreme
Court’s Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.96 The Court’s only contribution has
been to reverse lower courts attempting to give the “in connection with”
requirement some teeth.97
Fifteen years after Texas Gulf Sulphur and toward the end of his career, Judge Friendly took another shot at “in connection with.” Chemical
Bank v. Arthur Anderson raised the issue of whether a pledge of stock
was “in connection with the purchase or sale.”98 Six weeks after an argument that produced an initial unanimous vote of the appellate panel to
affirm the district court’s holding that it was “in connection with,”
Friendly concluded that a pledge of stock was not a purchase or sale,
maintaining the viability of the limits established in Birnbaum.99 Friendly
persuaded one of his panel members, so his view became a majority. His
opinion for the Second Circuit has been cited hundreds of times, not
often finding “in connection with,” but providing a way to explain this
doctrine that others have found attractive.100
B. STATE

OF

MIND

When the issue of state of mind in a private lawsuit eventually arrived
at the Second Circuit five years after Texas Gulf Sulphur, a majority of
the en banc Second Circuit (including Judge Friendly) held “that proof of
a willful or reckless disregard for the truth is necessary to establish liability under Rule 10b-5” for a private cause of action,101 distinguishing the
holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur that had accepted a negligence standard
for an injunction action.102 When the state of mind question reached the
Supreme Court three years later in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the SEC
supported the plaintiff in seeking a negligence standard under § 10(b).103
Powell’s opinion for the Court rebuffed the SEC holding that negligence
95. Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The SEC is not required to
prove reliance or injury in enforcement actions.”); United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542,
544 (3d Cir. 1998) (government need not prove reliance in a criminal case).
96. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 154–65.
97. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 824–25 (2002).
98. Chem. Bank v. Arthur Anderson, 726 F.2d 930, 941 (1983).
99. See id. at 945; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
100. This information is from a Westlaw search of citing references for “720 F.2d 930”
performed on March 13, 2018.
101. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973).
102. See id. at 1305. Four judges would have permitted imposition of liability on a director for the corporation’s misleading statements where the director failed to make any inquiry. Id. at 1311 (Hays, J., dissenting in part, joined by Smith, J., Oakes, J., and Timbers,
J.). The misstatements occurred in an exchange of stock with the BarChris Construction
Co. in a transaction at the same time as the famous § 11 liability case under the Securities
Act of 1933. Id. The dissent would have held the outside director liable under Rule 10b-5
for conduct similar to the behavior giving rise for liability under § 11 of the 1933 Act. Id.
103. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198–99 (1976).
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could not satisfy the necessary state of mind in a private cause of action.104 Powell relied heavily on a textual exegesis of § 10(b) in his opinion;105 purpose received short shrift. The SEC’s only consolation in Ernst
& Ernst was that Powell was forced, in order to hold his majority, to reserve the question of whether the scienter standard would apply to an
action for injunctive relief brought by the SEC.106 Powell’s conference
notes from Ernst & Ernst record Justice Stewart’s view that an injunctive
suit by the SEC might present a different case,107 but Powell’s heavy reliance on the language of § 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst undermined that position when the issue came up in a subsequent term. Section 10(b) makes
no distinction between government and private litigants, hardly a surprise
given that Congress did not anticipate private litigation under § 10(b)
when it adopted the Exchange Act in 1934. Nonetheless, “policy concerns” raised by private litigation played an important role in Ernst &
Ernst, as they had in Texas Gulf Sulphur, this time leading to a more
restrictive result.
Even with that necessary reservation, Powell did not go as far as he
might have in laying out the requirements of Rule 10b-5. On the question
of the required state of mind, Powell objected to his clerk’s distinction
between “‘knowing or intentional misconduct,’ on the one hand, and negligence or ‘negligent misfeasance,’ on the other.”108 Powell preferred the
middle ground established by Judge Arlin Adams in a concurrence to a
Third Circuit opinion:
Judge Adams in Korn [sic] (at p. 287) used language that I like: “An
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.” Adams, p. 285, also referred to Judge Friendly’s formulation as including “recklessness”
that amounts to fraud. What would you think of our using the term
“scienter” and defining it early in the opinion, using the Adams/
Friendly terminology?109
Judge Friendly’s influence was still felt; this discussion suggests that Justice Powell agreed with Judge Friendly that recklessness would satisfy the
104. See id. at 214.
105. Id. at 197–201.
106. Telephone Interview by Pritchard with Greg Palm, former law clerk to Justice
Lewis F. Powell (Jun. 6, 2002); see Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. The decision in
Ernst & Ernst was 6-2, with Justices Blackmun and Brennan dissenting, and Justice Stevens
not participating. If Powell lost Stewart and one more from Marshall, White, Burger and
Rehnquist, the court would have split 4-4. At conference, Marshall suggested that he would
be opposed to depriving the SEC of the negligence standard. See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes from the Conference on Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 2 (Dec. 5,
1975) (on file with the Library of Congress).
107. See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Handwritten Notes from the Conference on Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder 1 (Dec. 5, 1975) (on file with Washington & Lee School of Law Scholarly Commons).
108. See Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Greg Palm 2 (Feb. 4, 1976).
109. Id. (citing Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 285–87 (3d Cir.
1972) (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
(Friendly, J., concurring)).
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scienter requirement.110 The first part of this suggestion was adopted,
with the eventual opinion defining scienter as “a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”111 The final opinion, however,
did not incorporate recklessness, specifically reserving the question.112
Powell, despite his desire to offer guidance to the bar, had a general preference for not addressing questions unnecessary to the decision. Accordingly, he left resolution of this issue to a subsequent case.113 Thus, Powell
could have settled the law in Ernst & Ernst, but held back.
The Supreme Court continued to avoid the question of whether recklessness satisfies § 10(b), even as each of the circuits offered different verbal formulas. There were variations in these formulas, but they were all
likely in a narrower range than decisions in the 1960s and 1970s. Congress
has been no better at resolving the question. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 contains a section entitled “State of Mind,”
but eschews any description other than to say that the required state of
mind (whatever it might be) must be pled with particularity.114 Powell can
be forgiven for failing to anticipate that the Court would not resolve the
issue; the Court’s appetite for securities law cases would wane after he
left it. Congress’s failure to resolve the question is harder to justify.115
Four years after Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court closed the door on
the SEC’s attempt to gain injunctive relief on the basis of negligence.116
In SEC v. Aaron, the Second Circuit (in an opinion written by Judge Timbers, former general counsel of the SEC) read Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder narrowly in order to hold that the SEC only needed to show
negligence when seeking an injunction.117 Friendly, who was not on the
panel, expressed skepticism that Ernst & Ernst could be limited in responding to a letter Timbers wrote him about the upcoming opinion:
An injunction cannot be issued unless there has been a violation, and
if negligent misrepresentation is not a violation that would support a
judgment for damages, how can it be a violation at all? . . . I think the
best way to mitigate the damage is to do what I did in Lipper and
Commonwealth, namely, to read Hochfelder as applying only to neg110. Powell sent a copy of Ernst & Ernst to Judge Friendly, telling him that his “opinions and writing contributed significantly to our resolution of . . . [the] case[ ].” Letter from
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Judge Henry J. Friendly 1 (Apr. 6, 1976). Judge Friendly
responded that he “was delighted both at the result and at your skillful handling of the
problems.” Letter from Judge Henry J. Friendly to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Apr. 9,
1976).
111. Ernst & Ernst v. Hotchfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
112. See id.
113. Telephone Interview with Greg Palm, supra note 106.
114. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012).
115. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV.
629, 658 (2002).
116. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980).
117. Preliminary Memorandum on Aaron v. SEC, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Oct.
12, 1979).
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ligent misrepresentation.118
Powell worried about the SEC as well as private litigants: “[A] suit [by
the SEC] [and] an injunction are punitive [and] can impose severe stigma
[and] other penalties.”119 Friendly’s concern in Texas Gulf Sulphur that
§ 10(b) would not easily support a distinction for the required state of
mind between private actors (recklessness) and government actors (negligence) turned out to be prescient.120
Aaron raised another issue that was not present in Ernst & Ernst: the
state of mind required for liability under § 17(a) of the Securities Act,
which prohibited “any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”121
The Court had previously found in Capital Gains that similar language in
the Investment Advisers Act did not require the SEC to establish an intent to deceive.122 Powell discussed the case with Justice Stewart before
the conference and they agreed upon a resolution. Powell apparently
came round to Justice Stewart’s view that § 17(a) could not be interpreted
in the same fashion as § 10(b).123 Text prevailed over policy. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the Court, leaning “heavily + properly on Ernst
& Ernst.”124
For the SEC, Aaron was a victory, despite the Court’s rejection of its
argument for a negligence standard under § 10(b). Statutory language
and precedent preserved the enforcement tool of § 17(a), despite the misgivings of at least Powell and Stewart about the SEC’s use of injunctions.
The threat perceived by Powell was confined; Stewart took care to note
that the Court did not address whether a private cause of action exists
under § 17(a).125
118. Note from Judge Henry J. Friendly to Judge Timbers on SEC v. Commonwealth
Chemical Securities, Inc. (Mar. 22, 1978). Here, Friendly expressed agreement with Blackmun in Ernst & Ernst who had preferred the same standard for injunctions and private
damages but then opted for the lower standard for each, as opposed to the higher standard
for each that the Court majority got to after Aaron.
119. Bench Memorandum on Aaron v. SEC to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Feb. 15,
1980) (emphasis added by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
120. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d. Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
121. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 687 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (2012)).
122. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (flexibly
construing Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789,
852 (1940), which makes it illegal for any investment adviser “(1) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or
prospective client”).
123. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Handwritten Notes from the Conference on Aaron v.
SEC 1 (Feb. 27, 1980) (on file with Washington & Lee School of Law Scholarly Commons).
Powell notes on his copy of Justice Stewart’s eventual draft that Justice Stewart “reads
§ 17(a)(3) differently from my tentative view—but P.S. persuades me.” Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Handwritten notes to Justice Potter Stewart, First Draft Opinion, Aaron v. SEC
1 (Apr. 16, 1980) (on file with Washington & Lee School of Law Scholarly Commons).
124. Id. Justice Stewart again reserved the question of whether the definition of scienter
included reckless behavior. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 686 n.5.
125. Id. at 689.
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III. CONCLUSION
Texas Gulf Sulphur, a critical case in the development of insider trading, had an equally significant impact on the development of corporate
liability under Rule 10b-5 for misstatements by corporate officers, even in
the absence of trading by either the corporation or its officers. This aspect
of the opinion is an interpretive twin of the insider trading holding—the
emphasis is on the broad, purposive approach endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Capital Gains and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.126 Texas Gulf Sulphur
is truly a product of the jurisprudence of the 1960s.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s decision on corporate liability
differs from its insider trading holding in that it also contained the seeds
of limits, particularly scienter, that would be adopted by the Supreme
Court in the 1970s. The Supreme Court broadened the “in connection
with” requirement in Bankers Life. State of mind, however, took a different path. Powell insisted on a scienter requirement for private causes of
action, influenced by the views of Henry Friendly. Unlike the Second Circuit, however, Powell ultimately persuaded his colleagues to adopt the
scienter standard in SEC enforcement actions as well. Nonetheless, the
framework for corporate liability established by Texas Gulf Sulphur, despite having been pruned back a bit by the Supreme Court and Congress,
is still reflected in the litigation weapon against corporations that Rule
10b-5 is today.

126. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).

